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ROLE OF MARKETING AND  PROCUREMENT  SYSTEMS  IN
THE CONTROL OF AGRICULTURE*
V. James Rhodes
Issues  ancient  and  modern  in  the  structural  sequential,  and  its  practitioners  wrestle  with
organization  of  agriculture  are  newly  being  transmission  of value and directional  control between
legitimized.  As  one  evidence,  hundreds of extension  consumer  and farmer.  It  is  now generally  recognized
meetings  this  winter will utilize a  new  set of leaflets  that control  is somewhat diffused, as decision-making
entitled,  "Who  Will  Control  Agriculture?"  [8].  In  in  agriculture  is  divided  among,  at  the  least,
popular  articles,  speeches,  and  research  reports  consumers,  agribusiness,  farmers,  and  government.
various  aspects  of  the  question  are  being examined.  Consumers  and  the  consumption  function still are a
Even  Secretary  of Agriculture  Earl  Butz, himself an  favorite  for  analysis, while  a  whole  school has  arisen
agricultural  economist,  has  proclaimed  the relevance  dedicated  to examining  the role of government.  This
of  the  subject  [3],  not  to  mention  his  chief  paper  will  touch  those  two lightly,  and concentrate
economist,  Don  Paarlberg,  who  has  addressed  the  instead  on  the  control  relationships  between
same subject frequently  [19].  agribusiness  and  farmers  - an  area  too  often
Among  these  several  sources  the  focus  varies:  neglected.
optimal  size  of  farm  or feedlot  [1,  13,  14,  20]; tax  Certainly,  the  macro  influence  of consumers  in
issues  [5,  10];  the  comparative  advantage  of  the  any  market  economy  must  be  acknowledged.
corporate  and other forms of organization  [6,  7,  21 ];  Whether  one  conceives  of  consumer  sovereignty  as
economies  of  vertical  coordination  [17,  26];  the  nearly  supreme  or severely  limited,  it is  evident  that
nature  of  contractual  integration  [9,  12,  17]; and  consumer  influence  is  exerted  mainly  at  the  macro
bargaining  power  for  farmers  and  farm  workers  [2,  level,  guiding whether  more beef or pork is produced
23].  and  consumed,  or  natural  orange  juice  versus
This  paper  is  confined  to  certain aspects  of the  synthesized  orange  drink. Such consumer influence  is
role  played  by  the  agricultural  important to farming  situations, and  sudden shifts in
marketing-procurement  systems.  Putting  it  in  demand can be profitable  or costly to farmers.
conceptual  context  takes us back to the  elements of  Even  die-hard  free  enterprisers  grant  that  U.S.
classical  and  neo-classical  economics.  Both are based  agriculture  is  not  going  to be free  from government
on  the  blessings  of specialization  of process  and the  influence  so  long  as  "reasonable"  food  prices,
burden  of its  coordination,  and  of  distribution  of  "reasonable"  farm  incomes,  larger  agricultural
proceeds.  But  the  early  scholars  were  oriented  to  exports,  and  a  reasonably  pollution-free  rural
horizontal  size  and  scale;  their  thinking  fit  the  environment  are  important  national  goals.  This
division  of labor of the conveyor belt. Only later was  influence  too  is  directed  more  at  the  macro  of
sequential  specialization  and  its  greater  problems  production  and  price  goals  rather  than  dominating
recognized.  the detailed micro of individual farm decisions.
The  economics  of  agriculture  is  notably  Although  farmers  may  chafe  under  some
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31decisions  by  consumers  and  government  and  to  turn  to  the  firm  marketing  concepts  of  our
definitely  would prefer  to  have  more influence  over,  colleagues in the business schools.
or  freedom  from  them,  in  the  face  of these  two  A typical business school definition of marketing
groups  they  still  clearly  possess  much  freedom  of  is that of Professor E. J. McCarthy:  "Marketing  is the
decision-making  in their own farming operations.  performance  of business  activities  which direct  the
flow  of  goods  and  services  from  producer  to
FARMER-AGRIBUSINESS  DIVISION  -consumer  or  user  in  order  to  satisfy  customers  and
FRE-GIUOF  CONTROL  DVaccomplish  the  company's  objectives"  [16].  Do -OF CONTROL
farmers have marketing systems which direct the flow
of  their  goods  and  services  and  accomplish  their
Certain  issues  need to  be sorted.  An explanation  (farmers')  objectives?  For  most  farm  commodities,
of the  role of the  marketing  system in the control of  farmers  do  not have a marketing system. Instead they
agriculture  looks in two  directions; (1)  at transfer of  face  processors  and handlers who have  a procurement
control  from  farmers  to  the  marketing  system,  and  system
(2)  at  integration  forward  into  agribusiness  by  This  distinction between farmers'  marketing  and
farmers  in  an attempt  to  solidify  and  enhance  their  processors'  procurement  is  more  than  a  play  on
control.  Some of the  literature  in business marketing  words.  It  reflects  an important aspect  of the complex
may  be  helpful  in  perceiving  the  nature  and  issue  of control in agriculture.  While a dispersed open
implications  of  this  two-way  struggle  for  channel  market  model  of  farming  has  had  much  appeal  to
control.  Discussion  of  channel  control  by  farmers  and  to  agricultural  economists,  it  does  not
cooperatives  leads  into  questions  about  bargaining  provide a marketingsystemforfarmers.
and the  achieving of horizontal versus vertical market
control.  Here  it  is important  to distinguish between  Agribusiness Procurement Systems
our  issue  of  who  shall  control  decision  making  at
farm  level  and  that other  hoary  control  issue:  how  The  distinction  between  agribusiness
shall  aggregate  farm  production  be  controlled.  It  procurement  and farmers' marketingisrepresentedin
should  be  apparent  that  the  individual control  issue  Figure  . The  diagram  also  shows  the  variety  of
would  persist  even  it  the  possibilities  of  aggregate  farmer-agribusiness  relationships that canexistwithin
over-and-under-production  troubled us no longer.  each  orientation.  It  is  proper  to  look  at  the  top
Our discussion  focuses  on the division of control  section  beginning  from  the  right  as  the  processor
and  terms  of  relationship  between  farmers  and  initiates  procurement.  In  some  commodities
agribusiness.  Significant  transfers  to  decision-making  processors  today  face  a  "produce  or  buy"  decision.
from  farmers  to agribusiness have been publicized  in  Poultry,  cattle,  and  some  processing  vegetables  are
recent  years in  certain  instances  such as contractual  examples.  Within  the  "buy"  route,  there  are  two
production  of  broilers,  the  entry  of  some  large  alternatives  - to buy within a  market  context  as the
corporations  into  crop  or livestock  farming, and  the  commoditiy  is  currently  marketed, or to  contract  in
very  rapid growth  of large  corporate  cattle  feedlots.  advance  for  future delivery.  The  contractual delivery
Outmoded  concepts  of  the  nature  of  the  contract,  shown  in  Figure  1  as  a  procurement
marketing process may lead to misguided criticisms of  contract,  is  more  popularly  known  as  a  marketing
farmers'  resistance  to  losses  of market  power.  Such  contract  or a future deliverycontract.  While there are
farmers  are  sometimes  pictured  as lacking  consumr  several  variations,  it  assures  the  processor  of  the
or  market  orientation  and  the  blame  is  placed  on  receipt  of  a  certain  definite  quantity  at  a  specified
their  holding  an old fashioned  view  of farming  "as a  time.
way  of  life"[15].  Such  criticisms  seem  either  to  The "produce"  alternatives include either vertical
ignore  the  struggle  for channel control or to assume  integration  via a production  contract with farmers,  or
that  farmers  should  submit  meekly  to  agribusiness  production  in  one's  own  facilities  with hired  labor.
control.  It  should  be  clear  that  being  "market  Perhaps  the  best  known  example  of the production
oriented"  does  not  require  that  farmers  transfer  contract  is the feed  company  integrator which pays
channel control to agribusiness corporations.  the  broiler  grower  a  piece-wage  to  raise  the
Both  contractual  integration  and  corporate  integrator's birds.  But  some  firms produce broilers in
farming  may  be  perceived  within  the  context  of a  their own houses,  using hired labor; this is the "labor
developing  struggle  as  to  whether  farmers shall have  contract" of Figure  1.
their  own  marketing  system  or  whether  they  shall  These  first  four  options  may  be  regarded  as
become  raw  material  producers  delivering  to  an  progressive  steps from traditional agricultural markets
agribusiness  procurement  system.  It  may  be  helpful  to  an  industrialized  agriculture  - or  to  a  total
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Figure 1.ALTERNATIVE  PRODUCTION-MARKETING-PROCUREMENT  OPTIONS
agribusiness  system.  In  keeping  with  that  system  for'  a  commodity  in  the  hands  of  huge,
industrialization,  alternative  No.  4  involves  not  farmer-controlled  (presumably)  cooperatives.  This
farmers, but "industrial"  laborers.  cooperative  system  represents  an  additional  and
Although  all  four  of  these  alternatives  might  different  avenue  - it  is  a  farmer  marketing  system,
operate  simultaneously  in  a  commodity area,  one or  not a processor procurement  system.
two  would  be  expected  to  be  predominant  in  most  In  this system the farmer may sell either through
cases.  a  cooperative  sales  agency  (option  5)  or  to  a
The  most  important  implication  of  the  top  cooperative  processor  (option  6).  The  successes  in
section  of Figure  1 is that the independent  farmer  is  building  such  encompassing  cooperative  systems by
no longer necessary. He faces  a  procurement  system  strictly voluntary means have been sufficiently spotty
which may  be  able  to  get  along  without  him.  Even  that  questions  may  be  raised  as  to  the  need  for
though  he  may  continue  to  produce  and  sell  a  mandatory  membership  or  additional  incentives  to
product,  he  faces  a  procurement  system  that  is  voluntary  participation  if  such  cooperative  systems
increasingly  controlled  by  others,  that  may  be  are to be achieved.
capable  of  shifting  to  its  own  internal  production,
and  that  operates  by  rules  and  objectives  that  may
differ sharply from his own.  EFFICIENCY, SECURITY,AND
CHANNEL  CONTROL
Cooperative Marketing Systems
The  lower  section  of  Figure  1  relates  to  an  Only  in recent  years  has attention been directed
all-embracing  cooperative  marketing  system  that  to  the  economics  of  alternative  systems  of vertical
would in  fact  make farmers their own marketers, and  coordination.  More  specifically,  what  are  the
not merely  reactors to agribusiness procurement.  But  attractions of options  3 and 4 in Figure 1, over  1 and
first,  let  it be  clear that options  5 and 6  are not the  2?  To  date  the  preponderance  of emphasis  has been
familiar  cooperatives,  placed on the efficiencies of a system that assures the
If marketing cooperatives are only a minor part  of  farmer  of  a  specific  market  and  the  agribusiness
the  marketing  of a  commodity, they are  included as  processor  of  specific  quantities  and  qualities  of
part  of options  1 and  2.  A cooperative  could even be  products  [4,  15,  17].  Research  has  occasionally
fitted into  option  3 of production  contracts  -- there  documented  in  poultry,  or  in  specialty  crops,  that
are real-life examples in broilers.  there  are  potential  efficiencies  in  building  a  vertical
A mandatory  cooperative  system, as described  in  system that  is  of the  same optimal size at all levels so
the  Who  Will  Control?  series,  puts  the  marketing  that  the  hatchery,  broiler  houses,  feed  mill  and
33processing  plant are  all operating at optimal capacity  Market Security
[11].
The  Who Will  Control?  series  pThe  seeking of channel control relates  also to the
The  Who  Will  Control?  series  poses  these
problem  of  market  insecurity,  which  looms  in  the questions to farmers:  (1)  are options 3  and 4 more or 
background  of all.  While  channel control is ordinarily less attractive to them than options  1 and 2? (2)  what 
far  from a  complete  solution to that  problem, it  has
about  options  5 and  6,  and  5 versus  6?  In  a  more
',.~  ~~~  ^  J,..  ^strong  appeal.  Many  manufacturers  and  processors limited  sense  the  relative  attractiveness  of  these  s  s in  w  h te  anetnd  er  i  ece
seek  ways  in  which  they  can  extend their  influence options  to  agribusiness,  consumers  and  other  groups
is.  .Sc.  . e  o  ce  and control all the way to the consumer.  An example is  examined.  Such an examination  carries  us beyond
..  .i~~  .r~  .'~  -J  -is  General  Motors'  system  of  dealerships.  Through the  usual  efficiency  considerations;  it  focuses  upon 
control  all  the way  to retail,  GM is  able to  integrate the  general  motivations  of the various  actors on the 
auto  design,  production,  promotion,  and  retail sales economic  scene.
into an integrated  system  with the prime objective of
It  should  enlarge  our  perspective  further  to  selling  the  consumer  on  GM  cars.  Contrast  the dairy
consider  the  emphasis  on  the  battle  for  channel  farmer  who  watches  helplessly  while  a  processor
control  made  by  some of our  colleagues  in business  develops  a non-dairy  creamer or a filled milk product
marketing  [25].  that  cuts off  his market.  Farmers  are becoming more
Non-integrated  channels have  a problem:  what is  aware  that  they  possess  few  consumer  franchises  -
optimal for  one firm in the channel is not optimal for  that  their  markets  can  rise  or  fall  according  to
others.  True,  firms  have many common  interests and  decisions  made  unilaterally  by  firms  that  stand
there  is a  premium  upon their cooperation  as long as  between them and the consumers.
they all co-exist. Nevertheless,  any one of the firms in  Of  course,  this  problem  of insecure  markets  is
the market  channel  would  do some things  differently  not  unique  to  farmers.  Such  a  misfortune  has
if  it  were  in  charge.  The  manufacturer  may  seek  distressed  many  a  manufacturer  who  made  excellent
extensive  distribution  of  his  product  to  many  products,  but  lost  his  markets  to  another  who
retailers,  whereas  a  retailer  loses  interest  as  his  obtained  a  better  consumer  franchise  and  better
expected  sales  decline  with  more  competitors.  The  market  control.  The  lesson to that manufacturer  was
retailer  will  seldom  give  a  particular  product  the  to get as  much control  as he could all the way to the
merchandising  push  which  its  maker  considers  consumer.  However,  in  a  day  of powerful  retailers
justified.  Even  such  a  mundane  detail  as the  size of  like Safeway,  Sears, and K-Mart,  which are developing
the pallet  on which merchandise  is  shipped  may be a  their own  brands and their own consumer followings,
source  of  processor-wholesaler  disagreement.  These  it  is  difficult  for even strong  manufacturers  to break
problems  illustrate  motivations  for  channel  through  to  consumers  and  gain  a  firm  consumer
participants  to  seek  channel  control,  which  may or  franchise.  Thus  farmers  must  realize  that  market
may not include attempts to integrate vertically.  insecurity  can  be  reduced  but  can  hardly  be
eliminated.
In  principle,  control  of  the
marketing-procurement  channel  may be  exercised  by
firms  at  any  point  - i.e.,  by  producers,  A FARMER COOPERATIVE MARKETING SYSTEM
manufacturers,  wholesalers  or retailers.  For  example,
it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  breakfast  cereal  The  cooperative  model  in  the extension  leaflets
manufacturers  dominate  the  marketing  of  their  cloaks  cooperatives with power to manage  supplies. It
product.  By  virtue  of their economic  strength, their  is presumed  that this system is able to reduce market
product  image,  and their  massive advertising,  cereals  price  risks for the farmer and to provide  some of that
are  sold  on their  terms with no effective competition  market  security  which  is  becoming  more  and  more
from  retail  brands  [18].  On  the  other  hand,  much  deficient  in  those  open  markets  where  pricemaking
fresh  produce  flows  through  a  procurement  system  forces  now  work  so  poorly that  farmers  no  longer
dominated  by  large  retailers.  Milk  represents a  third  have much confidence  in them  [22].
situation.  Fluid  milk  distribution  was  once  largely  While the  cooperative  model assures considerable
controlled  by  large  handlers.  In  recent  years,  they  horizontal  market  power  for cooperatives,  they may
have lost  channel  control to both retailers and farmer  or  may  not  get  much  channel  control.  In  some
cooperatives.  Some  farmers  are  intrigued  by  the  commodities,  it  is  assumed  that  there  would  be
success of the  dairy super-coops in achieving a degree  forward  integration  into  processing  and  distribution
of channel  control, and  they are  asking if the lessons  of the type practiced by cooperatives such as Land O'
can be applied in other commodities.  Lakes.  In  other  commodities,  a much lesser degree of
34forward  integration  is  assumed.  The  author  realizes  of  channel  control  to  serve  their  particular  aims.
that  it  may continue  to be difficult  to achieve  much  Attempts to build a  farmer  cooperative  system are  as
effective  product  differentiation  with  many  food  natural  a  consequence  as  the  growing  agribusiness
products.  Therefore,  in  such  cases  channel  control  procurement  system.  It  is  not  a  criticism  of  the
would  often be  shared with strong retail chains rather  extension  leaflets  to  point  out  many  important
than being exercised  solely by those  super-coops.  questions  about  the  cooperative  system  which
Some  possible  theoretical  objections  to  remain:  (1)  in  which  commodity  areas  can  farmer
farmer-controlled  marketing  systems  need  to  be  cooperatives  achieve  significant  measures  of channel
entertained.  Most  economists  are  familiar  with the  control?  (2)  can  farmers  retain  effective  control  of
theoretical  demonstrations  that horizontal  power  at  such  cooperatives  so  that  they  do  effectively
one  level  of the market  channel  can generally  extract  implement  the  goals  of  farmers  and  aid  their
as much gains from  atomistic firms  at other  levels  as  retention  of control  of agriculture?  (3)  would  it  be
if  the  powerful  level  were  vertically  integrated  better  strategy  in  some  commodity  areas for farmers
forward or backward  [24].  The  correlative argument  to  strive  merely  for bargaining  cooperatives  or other
is  that  vertical  integration,  when  it  occurs  in  a  horizontal  control  rather  than  striving  to  extend
monopoly-atomistic  market,  must  be  motivated  by  control  forward?  (4)  what  approaches  are  available
prospects  of  efficiencies  of  coordination.  Another  for  obtaining  farmers'  support  for these  all-inclusive
part  of the model infers that even the potential facing  marketing  cooperatives?  (5)  what  types  of
of power  on one  side of the  market by power on the  reconciliation  are  possible  and  feasible  between
other  side  constitutes  a  motivation  for  vertical  agribusiness  and  farmer  systems  of control?  (6)  are
integration  or  other  exercise  of channel  control  to  the interests of various  other societal groups involved
circumvent  a bilateral power confrontation.  significantly  in  these  questions  and  how  can
While  convincing  in  a  bilateral  monopoly  or  a  conflicting interests be resolved?
monopoly-atomism  framework,  these  theoretical
objections  are  seldom  applicable  in  the  melange  of
market  structures  in  agriculture.  In  real-world  SUMMARY
agricultural  markets,  farmers'  building  of  channel
control  may  increase  modestly  their  gains.  Vertical  The  basic  situation  remains:  the  contest  for
integration  is,  in  fact,  often  sought  for  reasons  of  control between farmers and  agribusiness  now results
power  and  for  reasons  other  than  prospective  in  a  variety  of  relationships.  In  most,  processors
efficiencies.  On the other hand, where power  exists at  dominate  a procurement  system.  For  farmers to gain
two  market  levels,  exchange often  persists (example:  more  control  they  would  have  to  join  in  effective
fluid  milk  markets)  rather than  being  superseded  by  cooperation.  The extent to which cooperatives  would
vertical integration.  pursue primarily  horizontal power  or would gain and
This  paper has  argued  for a  broad  perspective  in  exercise  additional  channel  control  cannot  be
which both farmers  and agribusiness are perceived to  generalized,  if  only  for  the  reason  that  economists
be  motivated  toward  developing  their own measures  have not taken a good hard look at the questions.
REFERENCES
[  1]  Ball,  A.  Gordon  and  Earl  O.  Heady,  eds.,  Size, Structure and Future of Farms, Ames, Ia.,  Iowa  State
Univ. Press, 1972.
[2]  Breimyer,  Harold F.,  ed., Bargaining in Agriculture -- Potentials and Pitfalls  in Collective Action, North
Central Regional Ext.  Pub. 30, Univ. of Mo., June  1971.
[  3]  Butz,  Earl  L., "The  Battle  for  Control," Address  to FS Services  Annual Meeting,  Chicago, Ill., Sept. 22,
1972.
[  4]  Collins,  Norman  R., "Changing  Role of Price  in Agricultural  Marketing,"  Journal of Farm Economics,
41: 528-534, Aug.  1959.
35[5]  Dean,  Gerald  W.  and  Harold  0.  Carter,  "Some  Effects  of Income  Taxes on Large-Scale  Agriculture,"
Journal  of Farm Economics, 44:745-768,  Aug. 1962.
[  6]  Dovring,  Folke,  "Variants  and  Invariants  in  Comparative  Agricultural Systems,"  American Journal of
Agricultural  Economics, 51:  1263-1273, Dec.  1969.
[ 7]  Ginzel,  J.  A.,  E.  W.  Kehrberg  and  G.  D.  Irwin,  "The  Middle  Sized  Farming  Operation:  A
Goods-and-Services  Firm?" Southern Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics, Volume  3, Number  1,
pp.  123-128, Dec. 1971.
[ 8]  Guither,  Harold, ed.,  Who  Will Control U.S. Agriculture?  North Central Regional Ext. Pub. 32-1  through
32-6. Univ. of Ill., March  1973.
[  9]  Harris,  Marshall  and  Dean  T.  Massey,  Vertical Coordination Via Contract Farming, USDA  Misc.  Pub.
1073, March  1968.
[10]  Harrison,  Virden  L. and  W.  Fred  Woods,  "Nonfarm  Investors and Beef Breeding Herds - Incentives and
Consequences,"  Southern  Journal of Agricultural Economics,  Volume  4,  Number  1,  pp.
165-170, July 1972.
[11  ]  Henry,  William  R. and James  A.  Seagraves,  "Economic Aspects of Broiler Production Density," Journal
of Farm Economics, 42:1-17, Feb.  1960.
[12]  Jesse,  Edward  and Aaron  C. Johnson, Jr.,  "An Analysis  of Vegetable  Contracts,"  American Journal  of
Agricultural  Economics, 52: 545-554, Nov. 1970.
[13]  Krause, Kenneth and Leonard  R. Kyle, Midwestern Corn Farms: Economic Status and the Potentialfor
Large and Family-Sized Units, USDA, ERS, Ag. Econ. Rep.  216, Nov. 1971.
[14]  Madden, J. Patrick, Economies of Size in Farming, USDA, ERS  Ag. Econ. Rep.  107, Feb.  1967.
[15]  Manley,  William T. and Donn A. Reimund,  "Interrelations in Our Food System," USDA, ERS Marketing
Economics  Division paper at  1973 National Agricultural  Outlook Conference,  Feb. 21,  1973.
[16]  McCarthy,  E. Jerome, Basic Marketing: A Managerial  Approach, Homewood,  Illinois,  R.  D.  Irwin, 4th
edition,  1971,  p. 19.
[17]  Mighell,  Ronald L. and Lawrence  A. Jones,  Vertical Coordination  in Agriculture, USDA, ERS Ag.  Econ.
Rep.  19, Feb. 1963.
[18]  National  Commission  on  Food  Marketing,  Food From Farmer to  Consumer  and  related  Technical
Studies, Washington, D.C., June  1966.
[19]  Paarlberg,  Don,  "Farm  Policy  Implications  and  Alternatives,"  USDA,  paper  at  1973  National
Agricultural Outlook Conference,  Feb. 21,  1973.
[20]  Raup,  Philip  M.,  "Economies  and  Diseconomies  of  Large-Scale  Agriculture,"  American Journal of
Agricultural  Economics, 51:  1274-1283,  Dec.  1969.
[21]  Raup,  Philip  M.,  "Corporate  Farming  in the  United  States,"  The  Journal of Economic History,  33:
274-290, March 1973.
[22]  Rogers,  George  B.  and Leonard  A. Voss, Readings on Egg Pricing, Univ. of Mo. College of Agriculture,
Dec. 1971.
[23]  Ruttan,  Vernon  W.,  Arley  D.  Waldo,  and  James  P.  Houck,  eds., Agricultural Policy in an Affluent
Society,  New  York,  W.  W.  Norton,  1969 (Part  Four includes  four papers by Donald  Turner,
Don Paarlberg, Varden Fuller, and the National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber).
[24]  Singer, E. M.,Anti-Trust Economics, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall,  1968, Ch.  18.
[25]  Thompson,  Donald N.,  ed., Contractual  Marketing Systems,  Lexington,  Mass., Heath Lexington Books,
1971.
[26]  Williamson,  O.  E., "The  Vertical Integration  of Production:  Market  Failure Considerations," American
Economic Review, 61: 11'2-123,  May 1971.
36